Houthi threat brings Bab El-Mandeb crossings down another 50%

Strait of Hormuz

• There is no meaningful pipeline bypass for most Gulf crude. Saudi Arabia's East-West line to the Red Sea and the UAE's Habshan–Fujairah line together carry a fraction of what transits the strait, so a closure cannot be routed around at volume.
• Hull war-risk premiums for the Gulf are quoted per transit as a percentage of a ship's insured value. A listed-area change by the Lloyd's Joint War Committee repriices every subsequent voyage immediately — faster than any freight index reacts.
• Owners withdraw tonnage from a genuinely contested strait before rates are renegotiated, so available tanker supply tightens ahead of, not after, the quoted rate move.
• Because a fifth of LNG trade shares the same water, energy shocks here hit gas and oil benchmarks together rather than in sequence.

• Saudi East-West Pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea — partial relief for Saudi barrels only.
• UAE Habshan–Fujairah pipeline, bypassing the strait for a portion of Abu Dhabi's exports.

Bab el-Mandeb Strait

• Bab el-Mandeb and Suez are one decision, not two: a carrier avoiding this strait has already given up the canal, so disruption here shows up in Suez transit counts.
• It sits inside the Joint War Committee's listed areas, so hull war-risk premiums and crew-hazard terms are priced per transit rather than absorbed in normal operating cost.
• Vessel-tracking and canal-transit counts move within days of an incident, well before any freight index prints — this is the leading indicator for Asia–Europe cost.

• Cape of Good Hope, with the same ten-days-each-way penalty as a Suez diversion.